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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Petition for Review is from a final order of the Labor
Commission of Utah dated July 29, 2010. This Court has jurisdiction
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a),
63G-4-403, and 78-2a-3(2)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether Mr. Jex's motor vehicle accident, "arose out of and
in the course of his employment" under section 34A-2-401, Utah Code,
entitling him to receive worker's compensation benefits.
Standard of Review
The Court of Appeals should review the empirical facts for clear
error. The Court of Appeals will disturb the Labor Commission's findings
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals must
review the legal determinations of the Labor Commission under a
correction-of-error standard, giving the Commission no deference as
appellate courts have, "the power and duty to say what the law is and to
ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." Salt Lake City
Corp. v. Labor Comm'n. 2007 UT 4, PI3 (Utah 2007) (quoting State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The issue before the Court is a

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mixed question of law and fact, one that calls upon the Court to review
the application of law to fact. l

1

Respondents challenge the standard of review articulated by
Petitioner. He cites a correction of error standard of review. The correct
standard of review is articulated above.
2
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative law is Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Utah
"Workers Compensation Act"), the provision authorizing workers'
compensation benefits for industrial accidents. This section reads as
follows:
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who
is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment, wherever
such injury occurred, if the accident was not
purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid . . .
compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury . . . such amount for medical, nurse, and
hospital services . . . [and] medicines . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2011).
Utah Courts have repeatedly held that an employee's injury does
not "arise out of and occur "in the course of employment if the going
and coming rule is found to apply. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of
Utah, 939 P. 2d 177 (Utah 1997).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents the question of whether a worker is entitled to
worker's compensation benefits when that worker is car-pooling with
another co-worker and is injured in his personal vehicle while traveling
home from work from a construction site when, although having personal
tools in his vehicle which he used on occasion at his own leisure at the
work site, is not under the control or direction of the employer at the
time of accident; chooses his own route and manner of travel; is not
being compensated wages or travel expenses while traveling; is not on
any company errand; is not performing any job duty for any benefit of
the employer while traveling and, is not performing any work duties at
the time of the accident.
Course of the Proceedings
1.

On August 20, 2008, Mr. Jex filed an Application for Hearing
seeking worker's compensation benefits from Respondents arising
from a motor vehicle accident on July 22, 2008, while traveling on
1-15 on his way home from work. (R., 1).

2.

On October 6, 2008, Respondents filed an Answer denying worker's
compensation liability on the grounds that Mr. Jex's accident did
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not, "arise out of and in the course of employment" with
Respondents. (R., 13-18).
A hearing was held on February 26, 2009, before administrative
law judge Cheryl Luke. At the hearing, the parties presented
evidence including the testimony of Layne Jex and Trent Holden,
the latter who testified for Respondents. (R., 74).
On May 28, 2009, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order. In that Order, the ALJ determined that Mr. Jex's
accident did not, "arise out of and in the course of employment"
with Respondents based upon the application of the going and
coming rule. (R., 31-38).
On J u n e 26, 2009, Mr. Jex filed a Motion for Review challenging
the ALJ's Order. (R., 39-50).
On July 16, 2009, Respondents filed a Response to Motion for
Review. (R., 52-68).
On July 29, 2010, the Labor Commission issued its Order Affirming
ALJ's Decision. {R., 70-72).
On August 28, 2010, Mr. Jex filed a Petition for Review. Petitioner
later filed a Docketing Statement on September 14, 2010.
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Statement of Facts
1.

On J u n e 2, 2008, Mr. Jex began working for Respondent, Precision
Excavating. He worked as a machine operator. (R., 74 at 17, 49).

2.

On August 20, 2008, Mr. Jex filed an Application for Hearing and
claimed an entitlement to workers' compensation benefits arising
from a motor vehicle accident, which occurred while Mr. Jex was
operating his own vehicle while traveling home with a co-worker
from a construction site on July 22, 2008. (R., 1-9).

3.

On February 26, 2009, a hearing was conducted on Mr. Jex's
claims. Mr. Jex's supervisor, Trent Holden, testified at the hearing
that Respondent Precision Excavating is a St. George based
company. He testified that there was a decrease in construction
work available in the St. George area and that the company was
going to lay off employees. He noted that the company was able to
find work in the Cedar City, Utah area in lieu of laying off workers.
Mr. Holden further testified that he told employees that there was a
company truck available on a first come basis to transport them to
the work site. He indicated that those who chose to operate their
own vehicles would not be compensated for travel time or gas to
and from the Cedar City job site. (R., 74 at 106).
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4.

Mr. Jex testified that he occasionally drove his own truck to the job
site and that sometimes he gave rides to co-workers. Mr. Jex
admitted that he preferred to drive his own vehicle since some
individuals smoked when riding to or from work in the company
vehicle. He also confirmed that he was not paid for travel time or
mileage when traveling to or from the job site from St. George. Mr.
Jex also confirmed that he was not paid a gas stipend for his travel
to or from the job site, or when he made a total of two errands on
company time. (R., 74 at 50-54, 58-59, 63).

5.

On the date of the accident, Mr. Jex's work shift had ended. Mr.
Jex then left the construction job site located in Cedar City and
was traveling in his own truck on I-15 on his way home when he
was involved in a motor vehicle accident. (R., 74 at 59).

6.

Trent Holden testified at hearing that at the end of the day on July
22, 2008, he gave Mr. Jex instructions for the next day and told
Mr. Jex that he could leave. Mr. Holden indicated that he was
working late. Mr. Jex then drove down the hill away from the
immediate work area and noticed that a Mustang driven by a fellow
co-worker, J a m e s Irvin, was not on the work site. Mr. Jex assumed
that Mr. Irvin may need a ride home since Mr. Holden was working
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late. Mr. Jex drove back to discuss the matter with Mr. Holden and
inquired if he should give Mr. Irvin a ride home. Mr. Holden said:
"Yeah go ask J a m e s , if he wants to go now and give him a ride."
Mr. Holden testified that Mr. Irvin could have remained on the job
site and work overtime and ride home in the company truck.
However, from the testimony presented, it was not made clear by
Mr. Jex to Mr. Irvin that he had the option to stay on the job site
and to continue working, if he chose to do so.
7.

(R., 74 at 94-96).

Mr. Holden testified that he had never required Mr. Jex to give Mr.
Irvin a ride home. He simply agreed, at Mr. J ex's suggestion, that
if Petitioner and Mr. Irwin wanted to ride home together, they were
f r e e t o d o s o . (R., 74 at 94-96).

8.

Evidence was presented at hearing showing that Mr. Irvin left the
job site with Mr. Jex in Mr. Jex's personal vehicle. They made no
stops on the way home and, after 40 minutes into the drive, a tire
came apart on Mr. Jex's vehicle, and the vehicle rolled. (R., 74 at
29-30).

9.

At the hearing, Mr. Jex brought an exhibit of tools which he carried
in his personal truck. He claimed to have occasionally used some of
these tools in his work at the Cedar City job site. These tools
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included a tape measure, pipe wrench, crescent wrench, sledge
hammer, and a level.
10.

(R., 74 at 32-34).

On cross examination, Petitioner admitted that it was at his own
convenience to have the tools available for his use at the Cedar City
job site. He acknowledged that his ownership of these tools was not
a required condition of his employment with Respondent, Precision
Excavating. In fact, Mr. Jex admitted that Respondent, Precision
Excavating, had similar tools available for him to use at the job
site, and that the employer did not require him to bring any tools
for use at the job site. Petitioner also admitted that the tools were
used by him for his own personal use, and were not purchased or
maintained by the employer. (R., 74 at 66-79).

11.

Mr. Holden similarly testified that all of the tools needed for the
Cedar City project were provided for by the employer, and Mr. Jex
was not required to bring his own tools to the job site. (R., 74 at
97-105).

12.

Mr. Jex also presented testimony that on two occasions, he used
his personal truck to run errands for his employer on the Cedar
City job. Once, Mr. Jex traveled to Napa Auto Parts and later to
Wheeler Machinery to get parts needed for the project. He
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admitted that he was not paid for gas consumption at the time he
ran these two errands, but that he was on the payroll clock.
However, neither of these errands occurred on the date of the
accident. (R., 74 at 44-46).
13.

Evidence was also presented by both Mr. Jex and Mr. Holden that
the employer did not instruct Mr. Jex how to drive or to maintain
his personal vehicle; which route to travel to and from the job site;
that Mr. Jex was not under any employer control or supervision at
the time of the accident; and that Mr. Jex was on a public freeway
when the accident occurred. (R., 74 at 57-58).

14.

On May 28, 2009 ALJ Cheryl Luke issued Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order. In that Order, the ALJ determined
that Mr. Jex's accident did not "arise out of and in the course of
employment" with Respondent based upon the application of the
going and coming rule. (R., 31-38). The ALJ opined that Jex's
accident fell within the traditional going and coming rule situation.

15.

On J u n e 26, 2009, Mr. Jex filed a Motion for Review challenging
the ALJ's Order. (R., 39-50). Mr. Jex argued that an exception to
the going and coming rule applied since he was using his personal
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vehicle as an "instrumentality" of the employer's business on the
date of injury and did so regularly. (R., 39-50).
On July 16, 2009, Respondents filed a Response to Motion for
Review. {R., 52-68). Respondents argued that the ALJ properly
determined that Mr. Jex's accident fell within the traditional going
and coming rule and was, therefore, not compensable under the
Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Respondents argued that Mr.
Jex's vehicle was not an instrumentality of Precision's business and
in fact, Mr. Jex was not performing any job related service while
traveling home from work; was not on any company errand or
special mission at the time of accident; was not being compensated
for his travel time between the work site and home; the risk
associated with travel was one common to the general public; and
Mr. Jex was not under the control or supervisor of the employer at
the time of the accident. (R., 52-68).
On July 29, 2010, the Commission issued its Order Affirming ALJ's
Decision. (R., 70-71). The Commission agreed with Respondent
that Mr. Jex's accident did not arise out of and in the course of
employment. The Commission determined that Mr. Jex's accident
was subject to the going and coming rule and was not
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compensable. The Commission rejected Mr. Jex's arguments that
any of the exceptions to the going and coming rule applied in this
case.
18.

On August 28, 2010, Mr. Jex filed a Petition for Review. Mr. Jex
later filed a Docketing Statement on September 14, 2010.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Commission's Order should be affirmed. The going and coming
rule squarely applies to the facts of this case.

Contrary to Mr. Jex's

assertion, no exception to this rule applies.
The employer did not require Mr. Jex to perform any job-related
service or use his personal vehicle as a business instrumentality while
traveling to or from work. Mr. Jex was not on a company related "special
errand" or "special mission" at the time of the accident. 2 Mr. Jex was not
compensated for his time spent traveling between his home and the job
site, and he was not paid a gas stipend. The employer did not regulate
how Mr. Jex maintained or drove his own vehicle. The accident did not
occur on the employer's premises, nor did Mr. Jex's duties require him to
be at the place where the accident occurred.

The risk that caused the

accident was one common to the traveling public (a defective tire on Jex's
personal vehicle which Mr. Jex personally maintained) and was not
created by any duties connected with Mr. Jex's employment. Mr. Jex
was not under the control or supervision of his employer at the time of
the accident. He had chosen his own route each day, and had done so at

2

The transportation of a co-employee home was not mandated by the
employer as a job duty. Moreover, Mr. Jex was not compensated for this
travel. Hence, this activity does not qualify as a special errand or mission.
13
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the time of the accident. It was not a benefit to the employer for Mr. Jex
to ride home from the job site with a co-worker. Respondent, Precision
Excavating did not require Mr. Jex to take home a fellow co-worker on
the date of the accident, nor did the employer mandate that Mr. Jex use
his own vehicle for transportation to and from the job site. Mr. Jex could
have car-pooled with other co-workers, but he voluntarily chose not to do
so.
The Commission was also correct to note that finding of
compensability under the present facts of this case makes little sense
and would essentially eviscerate the going and coming rule. Simply
because a worker may carry with him a tool that could be used for work
(i.e., a favorite business pen or other article), or in this case a few
miscellaneous tools similarly used by many individuals in nonemployment settings, or that the injured worker elects to ride to or from
work with a fellow co-worker, does not unilaterally overcome the general
going and coming rule.
Moreover, contrary to Mr. Jex's argument, it is Mr. Jex's burden to
show, by a preponderance of evidence, that his case falls within the
exception of the going and coming rule. It is not Respondent's burden to
prove otherwise. Since Mr. Jex h a s failed to do so, and has failed to
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show any reversible error, this Court should affirm the Commission's
Order, deny Mr. Jex's claim for workers' compensation benefits, and
dismiss his Application for Hearing with prejudice.
ARGUMENT
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY RULED THAT COMPENSABILITY FOR
THIS ACCIDENT IS BARRED BY THE GOING AND COMING RULE

Mr. Jex challenges the Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's
Decision. He argues that the Commission, like the ALJ, improperly
denied his claims for worker compensation benefits since his accident is
subject to exception from the going- and- coming rule. He argues that
his personal vehicle was an instrumentality of the employer's business
and, therefore, is an exception to the going and coming rule.
Respondents disagree that any exception to the going and coming rule
applies and submit that both the ALJ and the Commission properly
evaluated this case and denied workers' compensation benefits to Mr.
Jex under the well-established going-and- coming rule.
In Utah, to be eligible for workers 1 compensation benefits, an
employee's injury must, "arise out of and be sustained "in the course of
employment". Utah Code Ann, § 34A-2-401. As a general rule in Utah,
an employee's injury does not arise out of and occur in the course of
employment if the injury is sustained while going to or coming from work
15
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since these injuries are outside the time, space, and activity boundaries
of work. See Drake v. Industrial Common of Utah. 939 P.2d 177 (Utah
1997); VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah C t App.
1995). The coming-and-going rule arose because, "'in most instances,
such an injury is suffered as a consequence of the risks and hazards to
which all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks
and hazards having to do with and originating in the wrork or business of
the employer.'" Drake, 939 P.2d at 182 (quoting 82 Am. J u r . 2d Workers'
Compensation § 296 (1992)).
In support of the "going and coming" rule, the Utah Supreme Court
has reasoned that:
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that it is
unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for
conduct of its employees over which it has no control and
from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the major focus in
determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a
given case is on the benefit the employer receives and his
control over the conduct.
Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Professor Larson indicates that this general rule typically applies to
employees having fixed hours of employment and place of work, known
as "inside employees". "Outside employees" are characterized as
employees that do not have a definite time and space boundary on their
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employment. See Professor Larson treatise on worker's compensation at
13.01. Utah's courts have explained that easier cases involve inside
employees. However, in more difficult cases, when the journey is
relatively regular, whether every day, or at frequent intervals, the case
begins with a strong presumption that an employee's going-andcoming trip is expected to be no different than any other employee
with reasonably regular hours and place of work. See Drake, 939 P.2d
at 183. (emphasis added).
In this case, the ALJ found that the motor vehicle accident in which
Mr. Jex was involved, did not arise out of and in the course of Mr. Jex's
employment due to the application of the going and coming rule. The ALJ
explains her rationale in detail as follows:
In this case the petitioner argues that the
transportation of co-workers both to and from the job site, the
carrying and use of personal tools at the job site and the two
time use of his vehicle to run a company errand are sufficient
to sustain a finding of compensability.
Careful analysis of the facts in this case even when
liberally construed in favor of the petitioner demonstrates
otherwise. It was clear when the job was offered that it was
the employee's responsibility to get to and from work (the
traditional going and coming). When there was not work in St.
George the employees were given an option of working at the
Cedar City job site. The company would offer to shuttle over
workers in the one truck that was assigned to the job site
supervisor. The shuttle was offered on a first come basis and
employees were not going to be paid for travel time or
17
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\

expenses. In VanLeeuwen v Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d
281,284 (Utah App. 1995) we find that the general rule of
non-compensability has an exception in situations where the
employer provides transportation primarily for the employer's
own benefit and exercises control over the use of that
transportation. Under Utah law the major focus in
determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a
given case is on the benefit the employer receives and his
control over the conduct of the employee. In this case Mr. Jex
made a choice to drive his own vehicle for his own reasons
including not being around smokers. The employer did not
exercise any control over what days Mr. Jex drove, what
vehicle he used, what routes he took to and from work. The
loose cooperation between Mr. Jex in offering rides to other
co-workers was not mandated by the employer. On the date
of the accident Mr. Jex offered the ride to his co-worker and
his communication with Mr. Holden is best described as
informational communication, not employer instructions. In
some cases getting a crew or other workers t o the job might
be of benefit to the employer. The trip in question only
benefitted Mr. J a m e s and Mr. Jex who wanted to travel home
from work like any other employee. There is no indication
that had Mr. Jex not offered a ride to Mr. J a m e s that Mr.
Holden and Precision Excavation's work would have been in
anyway hindered as Mr. Holden was ready and able to give
Mr. J a m e s a ride home. Indeed Mr. Holden testified that he
told Mr. J e x to see if Mr. J a m e s wanted to leave or continue
working. Mr. Jex botched the message and didn't
communicate it in a way that gave Mr. J a m e s the option of
working late which may have benefitted the employer.
Can Mr. Jex make his car an instrumentality of employment
unilaterally? Clearly Mr. Jex used some of his own tools at
the job and carried them in his truck. The convincing
evidence is that this was not a job requirement, and was not
necessary (he worked without problem on the days he rode
with Mr. Holden and did not have access to the tools). The
going and coming rule would be eviscerated if an employee
could choose to bring something to work) a favorite pen for
example (and unilaterally overcome the rule.
18
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The third exception that is suggested by petitioner is that he
was running a special errand for the company. They point to
the trips to NAPA auto parts and Wheeler Machinery and then
try to argue that giving J a m e s a ride home is similar. The
NAPA and Wheeler errands were on company time during the
work day and certainly if this accident had occurred while
coming and going to get parts on those errands we would not
be debating compensability. The accident in fact occurred off
the clock on the employee's way home. This is the traditional
coming and going situation and compensability is not proven.
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that it is
unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for
conduct of its employees over which it has no control and
from which it derives no benefit Cross v Brd. of Review Indus.
Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202 (Ut. Ct App).
In this case the petitioner has not proven that he was any
different then any other employee driving to and from a work
place and ride-sharing with co-workers as a mutual
convenience. Mr. Jex carried some personal tools that he
could and did use at the job site but he was not required to
do so and the company provided all necessary tools at the job
site. Lastly Mr. Jex was on his way home and not under the
control, direction or of benefit to his employer at the time of
the accident. There has been no proof that supports a finding
in the petitioner's favor under any exception to the going and
coming rule.
I find that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of
proof that the accident and injuries suffered in the motor
vehicle accident on July 22, 2008 arose out of and in the
course of his employment.
(R., 31-38).
The Commission agreed with the ALJ and found that while Mr.
Jex's truck twice served to benefit Respondent, Precision Excavating's
business, in order to be exempt from the going and coming rule, Mr. Jex
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must show that his truck served as an instrumentality to benefit
Respondent, Precision Excavating's business at the time of the accident
The Commission further explained, that at the time of the accident, Mr.
Jex was ridesharing with a co-worker out of convenience, not because
Respondent, Precision Excavating mandated he do so. The Commission
further explained that the employer did not pay Mr. Jex for his travel
costs or provide any transportation to him at the time of the accident.
Accordingly, the Commission found no control by the employer or benefit
to the employer sufficient to exempt Mr. Jex from the traditional going
and coming rule standard.
Respondents submit that the ALJ and Commission's findings and
application of the law in this case should be affirmed by this Court.
Av

The ALJ and Commission Correctly Determined that Mr.
Jex's Truck Was Not An Instrumentality of Business.

Mr. Jex argues that an exception to the going and coming rule
applies since he was using his personal vehicle as an, "instrumentality
of business" for the employer at the time of the motor vehicle accident.
He cites to a variety of cases in an attempt to support this position.
Respondents disagree with Mr. Jex's argument and assert that the ALJ /
Commission's finding that Mr. Jex's accident, occurring in his personal
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vehicle on his way home from work, is barred by the going and coming
rule. 3
Mr. Jex relies on VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Common, 901 P.2d 281
(Utah C t App. 1995) to support his argument. However, VanLeewen,
actually supports the denial of benefits in this case. In VanLeewen, the
Court found that the claimant's motor vehicle accident on his way to
work did not arise out of and in the course of employment despite
driving a company-owed truck. The court held that the going and
coming rule has some exceptions, such as where, "the employer requires
the employee to use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the business."
The court stressed, however, that the circumstances did not bring Mr.
VanLeewen's motor vehicle accident within the course of employment
since: 1) the employer did not require him to perform any job-related
service or use the company vehicle as a business instrumentality while
traveling to or from work; 2) he was not on any company related "special
errand" or "special mission" at the time of the accident; 3) he was not
being compensated for his time spent traveling between his home and

3

In Barney v. Industrial Common, 506 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1973) the
court stated the general rule that - ordinarily, an employee is not within the
scope of employment when he furnishes his own transportation and is
injured when going to or from his place of employment. Such is the case
here.
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the employer's office; 4) the accident did not occur on the employer's
premises, nor did VanLeeuwen's duties require him to be at the place
where the accident occurred; 5) the risk that caused the accident was
one common to the traveling public and was not created by duties
connected with his employment; and, 6) VanLeewen was not under the
control or supervision of the employer at the time of the accident, had
chosen his own route each day, and occasionally engaged in personal
errands while traveling to and from work.
Mr. Jex also cites Bailey v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n, 398 P.2d
545 (Utah 1965). In Bailey, an employee was involved in a fatal car
accident when driving his own vehicle to his work - a service station.
However, in Bailey the court held that the personal vehicle was an
instrumentality of business since it was used by the employee for
emergency calls at all hours; the employee was required to carry
necessary tools to service and repair customer's automobiles; the
employee permitted customers to use this vehicle when their cars were
being serviced; and the employee was reimbursed by the employer for all
oil and gas charges for the vehicle. There the court held that it was the
employee's regular and definite duty to take the vehicle to work at the
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service station in the mornings for its use in that business. The Bailey
case can be distinguished from the case at bar.
Mr. Jex further cites to Moser v. Industrial Commission, 440 P.2d
23 (Utah 1968). In Moser, the court held that a claimant's motor vehicle
accident which occurred when pouring gasoline into his truck, was
compensable. In Moser, the employer owed the truck but leased it back
to the employee. The court held that the status of the truck in that
instance was, "the same as if it had belonged to the company" since it
was "committed to being used in defendant's business." Additionally the
employee in the Moser case was under the direction of the employer to
follow specific maintenance guidelines, including reporting of any service
work needed.
Mr. Jex also cites to State v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051
(Utah 1984) to argue that an injury is compensable when transportation
is furnished by the employer to benefit the employer. In State, the court
evaluated whether a workers' motor vehicle accident was compensable
when she was on her way to a job related training program from her
usual place of employment. There, the court found the claim
compensable under the "special errand" exception since Petitioner's
employer benefitted from her training program, she embarked with the
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knowledge and at the direction of the employer and such travel was
directly related to her job function. See id. at 1054-55.
The facts of the present case support the ALJ and the
Commission's finding that Mr. Jex's accident does not fall within an
exception to the going and coming rule based upon the use of Mr. Jex's
vehicle as the instrumentality of the employer's business. Here, the
vehicle driven by the Mr. Jex was his own. Although Mr. Jex used his
vehicle on two occasions for business purposes 4 , the motor vehicle driven
by Mr. Jex was not committed to being used in the employer's business,
nor was the vehicle being used for any employer purpose at the time of
the accident. Unlike the court in Moser, Mr. Jex had not been given
any general maintenance guidelines for use or operation of the vehicle,
and he was not required to report any service work needed on his car to
his employer. Moreover, unlike the court in Bailey, Mr. Jex was not
required to respond to any emergency service calls for his employer; he
did not allow the employer or co-workers to use his vehicle for business

4

Mr. Jex presented testimony that on two occasions, he used his
personal truck to run errands for his employer on the Cedar City job. Once,
Mr. Jex traveled to Napa Auto Parts and later to Wheeler Machinery to get
parts needed for the project. He admitted that he was not paid for gas
consumption at the time he ran these errands, but that he was on the
payroll clock. However, neither of these errands occurred on the date of the
accident. (R., 74 at 44-46).
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purposes; and Mr. Jex was not reimbursed by the employer for any oil
and gas charges for the use of his own vehicle, either while on and
errand or when traveling to and from work.
In addition, Mr. Jex was not on any special errand for the employer
nor was the employer benefitting from his travel or directing his travel.
Moreover, such travel was not directly related to any job function rather, Mr. Jex was simply traveling home from work as he would on any
other occasion at the end of his work shift.
Mr. Jex also argues that because he had tools in his personal
vehicle that he would, on occasion, use at the employer's job site, his
accident falls within an exception of the going and coming rule. While
Mr. Jex admittedly had tools in his vehicle at the time of the accident,
the tools did not belong to the employer but rather, were his own
personal tools which he used on occasion at work. Moreover, as testified
by Trent Holden, and admitted by Mr. Jex, the employer did not require
that Mr. Jex carry these tools with him to use on any company related
project.

In fact, the employer had all the necessary tools available at the

job site for Mr. Jex's use. 5 Finally, as correctly stated by the
5

Mr. Jex argues that the company tools were not readily available for
his use and were as far as 2 miles away from his work assignment.
Respondents disagree with Mr. Jex's distorted assertion that the tools were
located at such a distance from the company truck which contained all the
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I

Commission, Mr. Jex was not using his tools at the time of the accident
nor was he using his vehicle to serve any employment purpose or for the
benefit of the employer at the time of the accident. He was simply
traveling home from work. To adopt Mr. Jex's argument would mean
that any time an employee carries a work related item in their vehicle
(i.e, a favorite work pen as stated by the ALJ as an example), or a
screwdriver, a wrench, or a tape measurer, and is injured in an accident
traveling home from work, the accident falls within an exception of the
going and coming rule. Certainly, this general rule would be eviscerated
if Mr. Jex's suggested application of the going and coming rule were
adopted.

need tools for the job and which remained on the job site at all times. At
most, Respondents contend that Mr. Jex may have had to walk a few
hundred yards to the company truck for tools, on occasion.
In addition, Mr. Jex argues that the employer expected him to use his
truck and tools for business purposes. That is not the case. Mr. Holden did
not testify that Mr. Jex's truck or tools were needed for any company
purpose. While Mr. Jex did r u n a total of two errands in his truck to pick
up parts, the employer did not mandate that Mr. Jex use his personal
vehicle to run these two errands since a company truck was always
available for Mr. Jex's use. Moreover, while the employer permitted Mr.
Jex to use some of his personal tools on the job site, there was no
requirement that he do so, nor was there any substantial benefit to the
employer since the employer had the same tools available in the company
truck for Mr. Jex to use.
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B.

The ALJ and Commission Correctly Held that this
Accident Was Not Compensable Simply Because Mr. Jex
Had a Co-employee Traveling with him at the time of the
Accident.

Mr. Jex also argues that because he was traveling with a coemployee as a passenger, the accident, "arose out of and in the course
of employment". Mr. Jex specifically argues that the employer required
and expected him to help transport employees to and from the job site on
this date and on a regular basis and was expected to be available with
transportation in his personal vehicle. Respondents disagree with Mr.
Jex's self-serving interpretation of the facts and his application of the law
to the facts in this case.
First, Mr. Jex incorrectly states that the employer mandated that
he transport co-employees to and from the job site. Mr. Jex's supervisor,
Trent Holden, testified that there was no obligation or employer mandate
that Mr. Jex transport co-workers to and from the job site on a regular
basis or on the date of this accident. Mr. Jex's decision to do so was
entirely voluntary and was based upon his desire to have company in his
commute home, and to ride in a smoke-free vehicle.
Moreover, Mr. Jex does not cite to any authority to support his
argument that the transportation of a co-employee unilaterally renders
the going and coming rule inapplicable. In fact, the present case is akin
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to that of Cross v. Bd. of Rev.. 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) where
the Court of Appeals held that a ride sharing arrangement between an
employee and his foreman was out of mutual convenience rather than at
the direction of the employer and, therefore, denied benefits. The Cross
court additionally stated that transportation to a job site is not integral
and necessary to employment as a construction worker. While the court
stated that the one benefit conferred upon the employer by such travel is
the employee's arrival at work, this benefit was insufficient to bring the
accident outside of the general going and coming rule. In fact, the court
directly stated that the construction business is not deserving of special
treatment in going and coming cases.
Other cases also provide support for the Commission's denial of
benefits in this case. In Wilson v. Industrial Comm'n, 207 P.2d 1116
(Utah 1949) an employee died while riding as a passenger with a coemployee. In the Wilson case, the court held that the going and coming
rule bars benefits. In that case, the court looked to a variety of factors
supporting a denial of benefits to include as follows: The claimant was
not performing work duties while traveling; the claimant was not at work
at the time set when the injury occurred; the employer did not change
his hour of departure form work; and the employer did not give the
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claimant any instructions on the route of travel, or exercise any control
over the employee. These factors apply with equal force to this case and
support the ALJ's denial of Mr. Jex's claim for workers' compensation
benefits. Mr. Jex's claim for workers' compensation benefits should be
dismissed with prejudice.
C.

The Commission Did Not Rely on Any Incompetent
Evidence.

Mr, Jex also argues that the Commission relied upon incompetent
hearsay evidence, amounting to a violation of Mr. Jex's right to due
process. At the outset, Respondents note that this argument was only
mentioned in passing in Petitioner's Motion for Review in a footnote. (R.,
47). Moreover, a timely objection was not made by Mr. J e x at the
evidentiary hearing.

Therefore, there is no error committed by the

Commission in its failure to address this argument as Mr. Jex provided
no substantive or timely argument on this issue at the administrative
hearing.
Aside from these procedural flaws, Mr. Jex specifically argues that
the Labor Commission improperly relied on a hearsay statement of
J a m e s Irvin, introduced through Trent Holden; that Mr. Irvin did not
want to leave the worksite but wanted to work longer on the date of

29
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

accident. (R., 74 at 96). At hearing, Trent Holden testified that when Mr.
Jex went back and asked if he should give J a m e s Irving a ride home, Mr.
Holden responded that he could ask J a m e s Irving if he wants to go and
give him a ride or that he could stay and work later. Evidence was also
presented through Mr. Holden that Mr. Irving was upset because Mr. Jex
never communicated that he could stay and work late. (R., 74 at 95).
Mr. Jex argues that this evidence was improperly relied upon by the
Commission.
Although these statements made by Mr. Holden are hearsay, Utah
law permits the introduction of hearsay evidence in worker's
compensation cases. Indeed, it is well settled that hearsay evidence is
admissible in an administrative hearing before the Commission; however,
the Commission's Findings of Fact cannot be based exclusively on
hearsay evidence and there must be a residuum of evidence, legal and
competent in a court of law, to support an award. See Hoskings v.
Industrial Comm'n, 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
In this case, there was other competent evidence to support the
ALJ and Commission's ruling that the employer did not mandate ride
sharing and was not controlling Mr. Jex's actions immediately prior to
the accident. Indeed, other non-hearsay evidence, including that
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evidence of Mr. Holden was presented at the hearing to show that the
employer did not require Mr. Jex to transport any employees to and
from work. (R., 74 at 95-97). On this basis, the ALJ and the
Commission's order is not based solely upon unsubstantiated hearsay
evidence.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should affirm the Commission's Order
Affirming ALJ's Decision. Mr. Jex's accident falls within the general
provisions of the going and coming rule. Mr. Jex has not shown that any
exception to this rule applies or that the Commission made any legal
error which warrants a reversal of the Labor Commission's decision.
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